
The Library Media — Opinion · Editorial
They Promised 90 Days. They Took 50.
By Catalina Clarke
Buried in the Federal Aviation Administration’s own questions-and-answers page about Friday’s nationwide ground stop is the most damning sentence the agency has published about itself. Asked whether its new artificial-intelligence traffic tool, SMART, was in use when America’s skies went dark, the FAA answered: yes — “but it was only in use at 17 of the 22” air traffic control centers.
On Tuesday, November 10, the FAA had announced SMART was live at all 22. It was not. Three days later the system broke anyway — not SMART, the agency now says, but the ancient network underneath it — and on Sunday the Secretary of Transportation went on television to explain that he cannot fire the contractor whose network is under investigation. This is not a story about one bad router. It is a story about a department that stopped telling the truth about its own timetable, its own rollout, and its own competence, in writing, for months, while Congress begged it to slow down.
Start with the promise. In August, Secretary Sean Duffy said the FAA would fully deploy SMART by spring 2027 and would “slow-roll different aspects” rather than introduce them all at once. When the tool debuted on September 21 — limited mode, Washington-area airports only — the airlines were calmed with a specific assurance, reported by Politico: a 90-day testing period, and only then a wider rollout. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford called it his hope. The agency’s own announcement promised to “deliver SMART in record speed,” and everyone involved understood the bargain: speed, yes, but tested speed.
Then came the warning, also in writing. On October 9, twenty-five members of Congress, led by Representative April McClain Delaney, wrote to Duffy and Bedford. They were, they said, “incredibly concerned.” They had “not seen any safety evaluation and testing reports.” Frontline workers had been “notified of the SMART tool rollout mere days in advance or not at all, giving them no time to learn how the system works.” The lawmakers asked the agency to “pause any use of the SMART tool” until its process could be understood, and demanded answers by October 19. The controllers’ own union, NATCA, stated flatly that it “has not been involved in the design, testing, or implementation of SMART.” Representative Don Beyer said controllers “were not trained on using it prior to the system’s adoption at local airports” and warned against using his constituents as “guinea pigs for an unproven AI air traffic control system.”
The letter’s premise deserves underlining, because the lawmakers wrote it into the record themselves: the rollout, they understood, “begins with a 90-day evaluation period before broader, nationwide deployment.”
On day 50, the FAA deployed nationwide anyway.
What happened on Friday happened to the old system, and honesty requires saying so plainly. At about 3:30 in the afternoon, data began flooding the FAA’s legacy network at a rate of a thousand connection attempts every four to five seconds; communications and radar feeds destabilized; and the agency grounded every flight in America for nearly five hours — the longest nationwide stop since September 11, 2001, with some 8,000 flights canceled. The network is operated by L3Harris, which had been doing routine copper-to-fiber maintenance in Arkansas. On Friday night, asked whether SMART could have played a role, Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin would not clear it: “We’re looking at that.” By Sunday, the FAA had: SMART “does not control aircraft. The two systems are not related.”
So no — the rushed AI tool did not ground America. The scandal is everything around that fact. A department that promised 90 days and took 50. That received a written plea from 25 lawmakers and answered it with an acceleration. That never brought the controllers who keep the sky safe into the room. That announced a nationwide rollout which, by its own later admission, had reached only 17 of 22 centers. That is, per Politico’s reporting in October, seeking an ownership stake in the very vendor — Air Space Intelligence, holder of a 12-year, $875 million contract — whose product it is supposed to oversee at arm’s length. And that, when the predictable failure came from the legacy system everyone knew was rotting, produced a Secretary whose Sunday message to the country was a request for $50 billion and a confession: “I would love to fire L3Harris, I can’t.”
This morning we asked whether the real issue was the contractor, the funding, or competence. The documents answer. A competent department keeps its own timetable, answers its own mail, trains its own people, and announces only what is true. This one did none of those things — and the proof is not in anyone’s opinion. It is in the FAA’s own releases, Congress’s own letter, the union’s own statement, and a number the agency hoped you would not read: 17 of 22.
Catalina Clarke
Editorial, The Library Media
From The Library — the estate of our family.
Follow Us
