
The Library Media — Science, Tech & Health · Tech Desk
By Gideon Black
An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation on Monday, November 16, injecting malicious code into customer projects through the service’s account sign-up flow. The incident turned a widely used website testing and personalization platform into a distribution channel for code that could manipulate cryptocurrency transactions, capture payment-card details entered into certain checkout forms and attempt to deploy sophisticated iPhone exploits.
Optimizely confirmed that “an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation.” The company said it had fixed the vulnerability and removed injected code from affected projects. The Register and The Hacker News reported on the incident, while security researcher Scott Helme documented its spread through monitoring by Report URI.
The distinction between a direct breach and a compromised supplier is central to the incident. The malicious code was inserted into the “Project JavaScript” configuration of customer projects and delivered from Optimizely’s own content delivery network, using the service’s own certificate. Visitors’ browsers therefore treated the code as coming from a trusted source. As Helme told TechTarget: “The uncomfortable lesson is that none of the victims were breached.” The affected organizations did not need to have their own systems penetrated for visitors to receive the malicious script.
Report URI’s preliminary scanning found infection in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets examined, associated with 178 organizations. The researcher cautioned that the actual number is likely higher. Organizations named in reporting include the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, ASOS, Mattel and Alaska Airlines. Optimizely’s own website and login portal were also among the affected properties. Some researchers have referred to the campaign as OPTIMJACK.
The timeline compiled by Report URI places the first observed injection at 04:21 UTC, in the BBC’s snippet. A mass cleanup occurred late in the day, and the infected files were clean by 23:11 UTC. That cleanup marks the end of the observed distribution window; it does not, by itself, resolve every question about the attacker’s access or the incident’s consequences.
Helme’s preliminary estimate, reported by Malwarebytes, is that the malicious code was served during roughly 34 million page visits. The estimate carries a wide range: between 6 million and 150 million visits. It should therefore be understood as an early estimate of potential exposure, not a count of people whose information was stolen or devices compromised.
The payload had several capabilities. Report URI found that it could replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page text, forms and links, as well as in clipboard contents and outgoing requests. The purpose was to redirect transfers to wallets controlled by the attacker. Report URI estimated that approximately $7,040 reached those wallets in roughly nine hours. StepSecurity produced a lower estimate, nearer $6,600. The figures are estimates from separate researchers, not a confirmed final accounting of all losses.
A payment-card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC, according to Report URI. It captured card numbers, expiry dates and CVV security codes entered into websites’ own form fields. There was, however, an important technical limitation: the skimmer could not access card details entered into hosted payment iframes, including those used by providers such as Stripe and Adyen. Report URI said it could not determine how many card numbers were exposed. The existence of the skimmer establishes a collection capability, not a verified total of stolen cards.
The most consequential claims concern the code’s iOS component, and require a similarly careful distinction between attempted exploitation and confirmed compromise. Report URI said that, on iPhones and iPads, the script loaded a second stage designed to deploy the Coruna exploit kit against iOS versions 13.0 through 17.2.1, and the DarkSword kit against versions 18.4 through 18.7. Google researchers have documented both kits. Apple versions iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, are patched against the relevant vulnerabilities.
But researchers have not confirmed that the campaign successfully took over iPhones. Cynet described the mechanism as “conditional delivery,” rather than evidence of a completed device compromise. Optimizely has also said that no iPhones were actively taken over. The code’s apparent capacity to attempt an exploit should not be reported as proof that an exploit succeeded. Report URI additionally documented cookie theft and screenshot capture among the payload’s capabilities.
Several important questions remain unanswered. Optimizely’s incident notice does not detail how the vulnerability worked, establish the total number of projects altered or explain whether the attacker retains any access. Attribution has not been established, and the investigation continues. The company’s confirmation of remediation is significant, but it does not settle those outstanding questions.
What visitors should do
Anyone who visited an affected site on November 16 should update an iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. Anyone who entered card details into a site’s own checkout form that day should review card statements for unfamiliar transactions. People who made cryptocurrency transfers should double-check the destination wallet addresses and confirm that the funds reached the intended recipients.
The incident demonstrates how a compromise at a trusted service provider can expose visitors across many organizations without a direct intrusion into each victim’s network. That is the supply-chain risk in this case: the trust placed in a common delivery platform allowed malicious code to reach a broad audience. The precise scale of resulting harm remains uncertain, and that uncertainty should be preserved rather than replaced with a more dramatic claim.
Gideon Black
Chief Skeptic, The Library Media
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